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1. INTRODUCTION
In this article, the status quo of fiscal federalism in Spain
is described. The article begins by outlining the process
followed by Spain in becoming the decentralized state it is
today and how resources have been allocated, paying par-
ticular attention to the main political conflicts that this pro-
cess has brought about. Secondly, the assignment of taxa-
tion powers is examined as this area has very recently been
substantially reformed and is bound to become one of the
main issues in relations between the central state (here-
inafter: the state) and the autonomous communities (here-
inafter: the Communities).
After being a centralized state for almost two hundred
years, the devolution process did not prove to be easy. It
was short, but politically very painful. As in other decen-
tralized states, the way authority was devolved to the
Communities had a very important affect on the allocation
of resources. This is why it is relevant that a few words be
dedicated to explain how this devolution process was car-
ried out.
2. IS SPAIN A FEDERATION?: THE INTENTIONAL
LACK OF DEFINITION OF THE FORM OF THE
STATE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1978
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (hereinafter: the Consti-
tution) purposely omits any reference to the form of the
state. That is, it does not describe it as centralized, federal
or regional. After almost 40 years of being a very central-
ized government under Franco, consensus on this issue
was difficult to obtain. The closest precedent for decen-
tralization in Spain was established by the Constitution of
1931 Ð the Second Spanish Republic Ð and lasted only
eight years (1931-1939). This model was intentionally not
followed as its tragic ending in civil war did not make it a
viable option. Until the Republic, Spain had been a cen-
tralized state for more than a century, which caused politi-
cal tension.2 The framers of the Constitution had before
them one of the most difficult tasks that Spanish politi-
cians could ever face: to resolve the Òregional questionÓ
for good. It did, however, seem to be utopian. Probably the
only aspect in which there was a generalized consensus
was that something new had to be invented due to the fail-
ure of the Second RepublicÕs decentralization model.
The makers of the Constitution met this challenge by not
defining the new system but by establishing a procedural
framework instead. Thus, what the Constitution does is to
establish an Òoptional autonomy systemÓ.3 It does not
establish a model for the state, but refers to a procedure
that can be followed. Thus, certain groups of provinces,
provided that they have common historical, cultural and
economic characteristics, have the right to decide if they
want to become a Community.4 If they decide to do so,
they then have to choose what matters they want to have
jurisdiction over. In other words, this is autonomy  la
carte.
The Constitution does not actually assign authority to
Communities, but offers them the possibility of assuming
jurisdiction over a group of matters listed in the Constitu-
tion.5
It does, however, reserve special functions for the state.
Thus, for example, the state is in charge of Òregulating the
basic conditions to ensure the equality of all Spaniards in
the exercise of their rights and the fulfilment of their obli-
gationsÓ (Art. 149(1)(1)), and is assigned exclusive author-
ity for Òcoordination of the economyÓ (Art. 149(1)(13)).
Despite the existence of two lists of areas of authority in
the Constitution Ð for Communities to choose from, and
for the state to undertake Ð the design does not end there,
as Art. 149(3) establishes a series of provisions that may
change the actual distribution of authority. Thus, Commu-
nities may take on the authority not expressly assigned to
the state by the Constitution and the state may take on the
authority not taken on by Communities. If there is a con-
flict over which tier should be assigned a given matter, the
norms of the state will prevail over the Communities.
Lastly, Art. 149(3) establishes that the norms of the state
will, at any rate, be supplementary to the Communities.
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This last provision has been the object of much contro-
versy, as the Constitutional Court recently radically
changed its interpretation to avoid its use as an indirect
means for the state to assume authority from Communi-
ties.6
Lastly, the Constitution allows the state to control
Autonomous Communities in some cases (for example,
Arts. 150(3), 153 or 155). In practice though, these provi-
sions have never been invoked. Instead, the numerous
conflicts have been resolved Ð or are in the process of
being resolved Ð by agreement.
One relevant feature of the Constitutional design of the
state is the strong role that the state plays in the distribu-
tion of authority. This can be explained by the coexistence
of the principle of autonomy and the principle of unity.
They are both expressed in Art. 2: ÒThe Constitution is
grounded on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation
... and guarantees and recognizes the right to autonomy of
its regions ...Ó. This apparent oxymoron has been the
object of many Constitutional Court decisions, which con-
firm that it is within the unity of the state that autonomy
can find its being.7
This process has given place to a form of state that, albeit
still not quite defined, probably falls, together with the
state forms of Belgium, Germany, Austria and the United
Kingdom, into the category of a Òdecentralized stateÓ.
When we take a closer look at the broad scope of decen-
tralization in Spain, however, and at the authority thus
gained by the Communities over the past 20 years, it must
be concluded that, whether we like it or not and this has
become quite a controversial issue Ð Spain is, in practice,
if not in origin, a federal state.8 At any rate, the Òpolitically
correctÓ term by which Spain is usually defined is that of a
ÒState of AutonomiesÓ.
3. THE DYNAMICS OF THE DEVOLUTION
PROCESS: THE ASYMMETRIC MODEL AND
THE NEED FOR BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Probably the most outstanding feature of this process is the
speed of its development. Between 1978 and 1983, all of
the regions in Spain engaged in this process; the whole
country is presently divided into 17 Communities.
The evolution of public expenditures clearly demonstrates
this speed. In 1978 the state was in charge of 89% of pub-
lic spending. Only 20 years later it is in charge of 51%,
with the Communities in charge of almost 33%.9
Another important feature of this state model is its asym-
metry. This asymmetry is both de facto and de jure10 and
explains the key role played by political agreements.
There are two reasons why the state model is asymmetric-
al.
The first reason lies in the procedural framework estab-
lished by the Constitution. It provides two special proce-
dures for Communities to be formed. They differ from
each other in that one allows for larger and faster auton-
omy, while the other entails a more limited and gradual
assumption of authority. These are usually referred to as
the ÒfastÓ and Òslow trackÓ processes. Fast track Commu-
nities take on more authority, including health and educa-
tion, which together represent about 80% of total authority
that can be taken on by Communities. Eventually, slow
trackers may increase their authority and gain access to the
maximum level, provided that they follow the process
established in Art. 148(2).
The original idea of the framers of the Constitution was
that some Communities with self-government experiences
should be given the opportunity to become fast trackers
from the beginning, while the rest would have to start by
being slow trackers. Hence the second transitory provision
of the Constitution, which establishes fast access to auton-
omy for those Communities that approved self- govern-
ment statutes in the past (i.e. during the Second Republic).
These were to be Catalonia, the Basque Country and Gali-
cia, which not only had brief access to autonomy in the
years of the Republic but also had in common a more or
less strong nationalist sentiment fuelled by the existence
of different languages. In the end, however, seven Com-
munities became fast trackers. Thus, in addition to the
three mentioned above, Andalusia, Navarra, Valencia and
the Canary Islands adopted the higher level of autonomy.
The other ten Communities maintained a lower level of
autonomy until 2002. The second main explanation for
asymmetry lies in the recognition of Òhistoric rightsÓ for
some regions. This has resulted in the Basque Country and
Navarra having a much greater level of authority, espe-
cially in fiscal matters.
The first type of asymmetry can be categorized as de facto
or transitory; it refers only to the initial process, but does
not prevent all Communities from eventually gaining
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access to the same level of authority. The second type is a
de jure asymmetry, of a much more controversial nature.11
This explains why bilateral and multilateral agreements
have played an important role in the assignment of author-
ity. Bilateral agreements have been necessary to address
the different autonomy aspirations of Communities. More-
over, in the case of the Basque country and Navarra, bilat-
eral agreements were the only possible way to address the
special status that Òhistoric CommunitiesÓ were granted by
the Constitution. Multilateral agreements have coexisted
with bilateral agreements and have served to greatly unify
the authority of the different Communities.12
On the other hand, the rulings of the Constitutional Court
have also played a role in the definition of authority. Tak-
ing into account that the vast majority of the areas of mat-
ters listed in the Constitution are actually shared between
the state and the Communities, it is not hard to imagine
that this has been a source of permanent conflict between
both tiers of government. The Court, as the exclusive com-
petent body to resolve such conflicts, has undertaken a
very important task in the evolution of the ÒState of
AutonomiesÓ.13 It has also acknowledged the important
role of agreements in the cooperative framework that is
needed for the working of the state.14
As a result, leaving aside the case of the Basque Country
and Navarra, the potentially asymmetric state model has
become quite homogenous. As of 1 January 2002, two
important matters that had still been unevenly assigned Ð
health and education Ð are now in the hands of all Com-
munities. Previously, this had been the main difference
between fast and slow trackers. Now all have the same
authority which, some hope, will provide the ÒState of
AutonomiesÓ with some stability.
Why it was done this way Ð as opposed to letting the pro-
cess give rise to an authentic asymmetrical state Ð can also
be explained by the political turmoil that followed the
transition towards democracy, and which loomed large
long after democracy was assured. There had been an
authentic fear of asymmetry that may very well be
unfounded.




It is commonplace in fiscal federalism literature to refer to
Òvertical fiscal imbalanceÓ as the situation that arises
when one tier of government Ð usually the central state Ð
has a greater power to obtain income than it actually needs
for the exercise of its authority, while the other Ð subna-
tional government tier Ð is in the opposite situation.15 This
creates an imbalance that must be resolved in order to
guarantee the required autonomy to the subnational gov-
ernments. Otherwise, they will not be able to exercise their
authority. The problem is easily understood and every
party to the conflict Ð central state and subnational gov-
ernments Ð usually agrees that it must be resolved and that
the allocation of resources must be rebalanced. As usual,
the conflict arises in deciding which of the different solu-
tions to use to solve the problem. Roughly, vertical imbal-
ance can be resolved through transfers from the state or
through a reassignment of taxation powers. As is well
known, there are different advantages and disadvantages
in choosing any of these solutions. In practice, a mix of
them will be used, resulting in most subnational govern-
ments receiving financing both in the form of transfers and
own taxes. It is also generally agreed that when subna-
tional governments receive financing almost exclusively
in the form of transfers, an incentive to overspend those
moneys is created. The idea is simple and somewhat simi-
lar to the Òmoral hazardÓ16 problem: it is easier to spend
monies when a) one does not shoulder the political burden
of having to raise them (i.e. establishing or raising taxes)
and b) there is no need to explain to voters/taxpayers what
the relationship between the monies raised and monies
spent is. In other words, the situation creates a lack of
accountability that may not be advisable.
This debate has also taken place in Spain. It has been said
that the low tax weight of tax revenues of Communities
results in an alarming lack of fiscal responsibility that does
not seem very consistent with the larger responsibility that
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Communities have in other areas.17 Significant examples
are health and education. This debate has given place to
substantial reforms of the CommunitiesÕ financing sys-
tems. The main objective is to increase the CommunitiesÕ
powers to establish taxes and thus change the present situ-
ation while they are still seen by taxpayers as Òfairy god-
mothersÓ who offer services to citizens without asking for
monies in exchange.
Here too, there are some important asymmetries in the sys-
tem, e.g. the rules for the allocation of resources are very
different in the case of the Basque Country and Navarra.
They have, inter alia, much greater taxation powers than
the rest of the Communities. These powers must be exer-
cised in coordination with the central stateÕs powers. The
following section explains the rules for the allocation of
resources in the remaining Communities, the Òcommon
systemÓ, thus leaving aside the above-mentioned special
regimes.
4.2. Mechanisms for the allocation of resources: 
the role of political agreements
The role of political agreements has also been very rele-
vant in the process of allocation of resources between the
different tiers of government. This is quite a politicized
issue in Spain that has been the cause of much stress
between the state and some Communities (especially Cat-
alonia and the Basque Country).
There are two major types of agreement, which are closely
related: agreement between different political parties and
negotiations between the state and the Communities (both
bilateral and multilateral). The process usually unfolds as
follows:
First, a multilateral agreement between the state and all the
Communities is reached. This is done in the Finance and
Tax Policy Council (FTPC), where the finance ministers
of all Communities and the state are represented. Once an
agreement has been approved, bilateral agreements with
the state are signed. This is done in the ÒMixed Commis-
sionsÓ.18 In a parallel way, the main political parties usu-
ally negotiate the finance reforms.
This agreement system serves to give weight to the Com-
munitiesÕ opinions on the allocation of resources. It has
been broadly criticized, however, for its lack of trans-
parency, as the agreements take place behind closed doors
and the results are only partially made public. This may be
referred to as Òexecutive federalismÓ. The result may be a
restriction on democracy.19 It is often argued that most of
this political discussion should take place in the senate,
which, at least in theory, although not in practice, is the
representative chamber of the Communities.20
Another widely held criticism of the agreements is that
they modify the rules for the allocation of resources, estab-
lished in the Constitution and in the laws, to benefit those
Communities in a better position to negotiate. These criti-
cisms mainly arose after Convergncia i Uni (CiU), the
Catalonian nationalist party, helped the two main national
political parties, the Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol
(PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP), to have a sufficient
majority to govern. In exchange, CiU wanted and obtained
a revision of the financing system of the Communities.21
The subsequent reforms in the system applied, however, to
all Communities, not only Catalonia. Thus, this second
criticism is, in the authorÕs opinion, totally unfounded.
On the other hand, even the most critical agree that politi-
cal agreements on the allocation of resources have played
a very important role in guaranteeing Communities suffi-
cient means for exercising their authority. Agreements are
an essential part of a cooperative federalism system and
cannot always be substituted by debate in parliament.22
This said, a reform of the senate is necessary as it would be
the best way to reinforce these agreements.
4.3. The allocation of resources under the
Constitution: the role of transfers and taxes in
the financing of the Communities
In accordance with the recognition of autonomy, or stated
more accurately, the recognition of the right to be
autonomous, the Spanish Constitution grants formed
Communities Òfinancial autonomy for the development
and execution of their authorityÓ. The Constitutional
Court has interpreted this as their right to have sufficient
means for carrying out their authority, as well as the right
to manage those means without the state imposing undue
conditions.23
Apart from stating this principle of financial autonomy,
the Constitution establishes a list of resources that will
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constitute the CommunitiesÕ income. This list includes
almost all possible kinds of resources. Thus, they may
obtain revenues from ceded taxes, surtaxes on existing
state taxes, their own taxes and public debt and transfers
(Art. 157(1)). The Constitution does not do much more,
however, than list these resources. In the same section
(157.3), it allows the state to approve a law regulating how
these resources will be distributed among the Communi-
ties and, more importantly, the limits on the exercise of the
CommunitiesÕ financial powers over the resources.
This implies that the state is given the power to quite
broadly both limit and control the financial autonomy of
the Communities. To some, this is inconsistent with the
recognition of the right to autonomy granted to the Com-
munities. The state has made use of this possibility and
approved a set of laws that greatly limit the financial
autonomy of Communities.24
A good example of these limits are those established on
the creation of new taxes by Communities discussed in the
next section. Although it is not always clear whether it is
the limitations on establishing new taxes or the unwilling-
ness to withstand the political consequences of increasing
the tax burden that has deterred Communities from creat-
ing new taxes, the existence of such limits underlines the
importance of intergovernmental transfers in Spain and
explains the substantial imbalance between the Communi-
tiesÕ autonomy over spending Ð which has been strongly
supported by the Constitutional Court Ð and their limited
power to raise their own revenues.
Therefore, since the beginning of the ÒState of
AutonomiesÓ, transfers have played a far more important
role than own taxes, which has resulted in the Communi-
tiesÕ financial dependence on the state, as can be seen in
the figure below.
If we take into account that ceded taxes, as we will later
see, are closer to being a transfer than a tax revenue, the
conclusion is clear: CommunitiesÕ own resources account
for only 4.2% of their total income. Meanwhile, as we
have seen, they are in charge of almost one third of public
expenditures.
Since the early years of the State of Autonomies, the allo-
cation of resources has been consistent with the devolution
of authority to the Communities in that, since the first mat-
ters were devolved to them, stress has been put on the suf-
ficiency of the CommunitiesÕ financing, which has been
done mainly through unconditional transfers from the state
to the Communities.
These transfers were traditionally supposed to be based
upon need. That is, the cost of the devolved authority
would be calculated and a given amount would then be
transferred to the Communities. In reality, the cost was
never actually calculated but rather negotiated in bilateral
commissions (between the state and each Community)
that would meet behind closed doors and agree on a cer-
tain quantity. This was done because the existing account-
ing systems of the state were inadequate for such calcula-
tions; thus, the actual cost of the transferred services was
never actually determined.25 This continuous negotiation
was also the object of sharp criticism from different sec-
tors. Apart from the argument that it was undemocratic, it
was deemed to create inequalities from a financial per-
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1996).
Source: The author and Ministerio de Hacienda, Secretaría de Estado de Presupuestos y Gastos, Informe sobre la financiacíon de


































spective as, eventually, those Communities whose bar-
gaining position was weaker would get less monies to
exercise their authority.
Conditional transfers have a large relative weight in the
financing of Communities. As in many other decentralized
states, their mere existence has given rise to many contro-
versies in the past. According to the Constitutional CourtÕs
rulings, when the state transfers monies to the Communi-
ties, these transfers must be unconditional if their object is
to pay for classes of matters that fall under the authority of
the Communities. Otherwise, according to the Court, the
spending power of the state would be intrusive, serving
indirectly as a way of controlling the CommunitiesÕ activ-
ities.26 Although this general principle has been stated in
the case law, in practice this has been a continuous source
of stress between the Communities and the state. The main
claim of the Communities has been that the state puts con-
ditions on the transfers of monies that go far beyond its
authority, thus intruding into the CommunitiesÕ powers.
This financial dependence of Communities was not a
problem in the early years of the Spanish government.
Back then, the Communities were regarded with a certain
distrust and some of their attempts to establish new taxes
were severely rejected by voters.27 This rejection can also
be explained by the major tax reform that took place at the
end of the 1970s, which brought about a great increase in
the tax burden necessary to help the transformation of
Spain into a welfare state.
As the Communities gained more authority, their financial
needs grew substantially and a greater expansion of the
transfer system was needed. Thus, the more autonomous
Communities, that is, those that followed the Òfast trackÓ
and gained greater authority, ended up being the most
financially dependent. Debates about the CommunitiesÕ
fiscal responsibility became one of the main issues in the
relationship between the state and the Communities. By
the end of the 1980s, certain Communities were ready to
play a more active role in taxation policy. At this time,
some Communities (such as Galicia and Catalonia)28
introduced proposals to obtain a greater part of their
resources from taxes, as opposed to getting it from trans-
fers. Moreover, once the ÒState of AutonomiesÓ had
become a reality, the idea that the Communities should
have more of a say in taxation matters became common
place. One of the main problems was the limited scope of
the CommunitiesÕ taxation powers, as is discussed in the
next section.
4.4. The limited powers of the Communities to
establish new taxes
Although the Constitution bestows taxation powers upon
the Communities (Arts. 133 and 157), the Autonomous
Communities Finance Act imposes severe limits on the
creation of new taxes. The most important limitation is the
prohibition of double taxation, which prevents Commu-
nity taxes from being similar to taxes created by the cen-
tral state and the municipalities. As these two bodies had
already established taxes on most of the imaginable
sources of revenues, little tax room was left for Communi-
ties.29 Moreover, the Constitutional Court recently broadly
interpreted these limits, making it almost impossible for
Communities to invent new taxes.30 The existing tax room
was traditionally occupied by the state and the municipal-
ities, and this did not change when the Communities
became a reality.
Therefore, despite Constitutional provisions that guaran-
tee Communities both the power to establish taxes and
financial autonomy (Art. 156(1)), the limits established by
the central state have led to a system whereby taxation
powers remain mostly in the stateÕs hands.
In order to avoid the limitation on double taxation and at
the same time make taxes more ÒattractiveÓ to taxpayers,
in the late 1980s Communities began to establish taxes
that differed greatly from the traditional ones. Their objec-
tive was not only to obtain monies from taxpayers but also
to serve some social objectives such as the protection of
the environment. These are the Ògreen taxesÓ. At present,
most Community taxes apparently fall under this fairly
new category of taxes. In taking a closer look at the struc-
ture of many of these taxes, however, it is apparent that
they are just regular run-of-the-mill taxes dressed-up as
ÒgreenÓ to serve the two objectives mentioned above. The
Constitutional Court recently declared one of these taxes
void.31 Although the general reasoning in the decision is
quite defensible, one of the reasons the tax was found to be
void was that Ð according to the Court Ð it was not a real
green tax.
Generally, the establishment of new taxes is not a very
good option for Communities. On the one hand, most of
the CommunitiesÕ taxes are very costly to administer and
do not generate much income, as can be seen in the figure
on the preceding page. On the other hand, almost every
time a Community establishes a new tax, the state chal-
lenges it before the Constitutional Court.32
This reality has inspired the reforms of 1997 and 2002,
which are very likely the most important reforms in the
system of allocation of resources between the state and the
Communities since the ÒState of AutonomiesÓ was born.
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26. Decision 13/1992.
27. In this respect, what happened to the Community of Madrid is quite signifi-
cant. In the early 1980s it decided to establish a surtax on the stateÕs individual
income tax of about 3%. Many argued that such a surtax was unconstitutional
and it was challenged before the Constitutional Court. In decision 150/1990 the
Court declared it perfectly valid. The law never actually entered into force, how-
ever, and the government that had established it (PSOE) lost the next election to
the PP.
28. Generalidad de Catalua, note 25.
29. See Zornoza Prez, notes 17 and 25.
30. Decision 289/2000.
31. Decision 289/2000 declared void the tax on facilities that affect the envi-
ronment, established by the Balearic Community.
32. Recently, Catalonia established a tax on large commercial areas (Impuesto
sobre grandes establecimientos comerciales) by Law 16/2000 of 29 December.
No sooner had the law been approved by CataloniaÕs parliament than it was chal-
lenged by the state before the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it is 
equivalent to some of the municipality taxes (the property tax and the economic
activities tax).
4.5. The attempt to reassign taxation powers in the
ÒState of AutonomiesÓ: The 1997 and 2002
ceded taxes reforms
Until 1997, the main principle for financing the Commu-
nities had been the principle of sufficient means. As a
result of the 1997 reforms, the goal is to have Communi-
ties that are more involved in the establishment of taxes
and are thus more directly accountable to the taxpayers for
the monies they spend. This was accomplished through a
reassignment of taxation powers that took place between
1997 and 2002. As with other reforms, bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements have played a major role in the reas-
signment. As a result of these reforms, the Communities
still rely mainly on transfers but their taxation powers have
substantially increased, which is bound to decrease the fis-
cal dependence of Communities in the future.
The reforms consist basically of the sharing of some tax
room that until then had been occupied only by the state.
This is done though a type of resource called a Òceded
taxÓ. Note that the term ÒcededÓ is not quite accurate, as it
was not the tax but rather its yield that was ceded to Com-
munities.
Thus, until 1997, ceded taxes were state taxes whose yield
was granted to Communities according to the taxes paid
within their territory. Due to powers delegated by the state,
Communities had also taken on responsibility for adminis-
tering these taxes. Ceded taxes were a kind of transfer,
pursuant to which some of the taxes owned and entirely
regulated by the state accrued to and were administered by
the Communities. This differs from a transfer in that Com-
munities may receive a sort of ÒbonusÓ in some cases.
Thus, if the actual yield of the tax is superior to what had
been forecasted by the state, the Communities receive the
difference. If it is less, the Community receives the initial
forecasted quantity. This increase in the yield may or may
not, however, be a consequence of a better administration;
for example, it may be due to mere economic reasons.
Therefore, this ÒbonusÓ only partially serves as an incent-
ive for Communities to more efficiently administer ceded
taxes.33 On the other hand, the CommunitiesÕ decision-
making powers over these kinds of taxes are almost non-
existent. It may thus be concluded that ceded taxes are a
type of resource that is conceptually closer to a transfer.
In order to give the Communities more tax room, a reform
was enacted giving ceded taxes quite a different meaning
than they had had until then. The power to regulate some
aspects of these taxes Ð mainly tax brackets, tax rates and
some tax credits Ð was conferred on the Communities.
What until 1997 had been a form of transfer became a
form of tax sharing.34
The powers that Communities have over the various ceded
taxes differ. As a result, depending on the tax, the yield
will totally or partially accrue to the Communities, who
may or may not take on legislative powers and may or may
not be in charge of administering the tax.
CEDED TAXES AS OF 1 JANUARY 1997
Ceded taxes Yield to Administration Legislative 
Communities powers that 
(%) Communities
may take on
individual 33 state – tax rates (must














inheritance 100 Communities – reductions in
and gift the taxable
taxes income
– tax rates
transfer tax 100 Communities – tax rates
and stamp 
duty
gambling 100 Communities – exemptions






The Communities are given the option to choose whether
they want to exercise their regulatory powers. If they fail
to do so or decide not to exercise such powers, the state
regulates every aspect of the Community. If a Community
decides to exercise regulatory powers over any ceded tax,
it may do so by approving legislation that will then take
the place of the state law in those areas where the Com-
munity can legislate.
For instance, in the case of the net wealth tax (where Com-
munities may establish whatever tax rates they choose),
state legislation on tax rates will be applied to residents in
those Communities that decide not to establish their own
tax rates. Communities may also decide not to make use of
the conferred powers, in which case the state legislation
will apply.
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33. The administration of ceded taxes by Communities is a major problem that
has not, in the authorÕs opinion, received enough attention by politicians and
scholars. As the excellent study of A. Garca Martnez shows, La Gestin de los
tributos autonmicos (Madrid: Cvitas, 2000), this administration is, generally
speaking, quite inefficient. This is due to several reasons that the author thor-
oughly explains in this work. In short, it is due to the amazing lack of coopera-
tion between the Communities and the state in this task.
34. See in respect of this reform: J.J. Zornoza Prez, ÒCorresponsabilidad fis-
cal y financiacin de las Comunidades Autnomas: el modelo para el quinque-
nio 1997-2001Ó, in Jimnez-Blanco and Martnez Simancas (eds.), El Estado de
las Autonomas (Madrid: Ceura, 1997); J. Ruiz-Huerta and J. Lpez Laborda,
ÒCatorce preguntas sobre el nuevo sistema de financiacin autonmicaÓ, in
Informe Comunidades Autnomas 1996 (Barcelona: Instituto de Derecho
Pblico, 1997; and Castells (2000)(b), note 17.
Please note that the above description of tax credits is only
a basic summary. There are extensive regulations on the
different tax credits in each Community. Thus, the condi-
tions that need to be met to benefit from them vary sub-
stantially depending on the Community (i.e. different tax-
able base thresholds).35 Also, the credits themselves vary
substantially from each other. For example, with respect to
the Òbaby bonusesÓ, different weights are given by each
Community as to the problem of birth rates:36
The way that this option has been structured Ð and the fact
that the state still guarantees Communities lump-sum
grants allocated on the basis of historical shares in state
transfers Ð serves to create a strong disincentive for Com-
munities to use their new taxation powers. Proof of this
disincentive is the fact that since 1997, the Communities
have used their powers mainly to create new fiscal bene-
fits.
There is a considerable number of examples. With respect
to individual income tax, there are, among others, the fol-
lowing tax credits:
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35. Further information about ceded taxes can be found at www.aeat.es.
36. Note that Spain has one of the lowest birth rates in the world.
Communities Tax credits in respect of individual income tax – IRPF (*)
Andalucia (**)
Aragon – “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
Asturias has not regulated any aspect of the IRPF
Balearic Islands – taxpayer older than 65
– disabled taxpayer or ascendants or descendants
– acquisition of house by taxpayers younger than 32
– kindergarten for taxpayers’ descendants between the ages of 3 and 6
– descendant attending university outside the island of residence
Canary Islands has not regulated any aspect of the IRPF
Cantabria has not regulated any aspect of the IRPF
Castilla-La Mancha (**)
Castilla and Leon – taxpayer with more than three children (if disabled children, increase of the quantity)
– “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
– investment in property categorized as historic or artistic
Catalonia – “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
– donations to funds the object of which is the protection and enhancement of the use of the Catalonian
language.
Extremadura (**)
Galicia – “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
– taxpayer with more than three children (if disabled children, the quantity increases)
– payment to another person for taking care of a taxpayer’s child under three
Madrid – “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
– donations to certain cultural entities
– ascendants older than 65 living with taxpayer
Murcia – acquisition of house by taxpayers younger than 30
– donations to certain cultural entities
Rioja – “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
– acquisition of house by taxpayers younger than 32
– acquisition of a second house in certain small villages of La Rioja that are particularly underpopulated
Valencia – “baby bonus”: birth or adoption of child
– taxpayer older than 65 and disabled
– acquisition of first house by taxpayers younger than 35
– donations to certain cultural entities, the object of which is the protection of the environment
– spouse unemployed
(*) According to Laws 7/2001 and 21/2001, the individual income tax Communities may: 1) establish tax rates with the same pro-
gressivity as the state’s and 2) establish tax credits for personal and family circumstances and for investments not related to pro-
fessional or commercial economic activities.
(**) These three Communities did not accept the finance model for 1997/2001 with the consequence, inter alia, that they did not have
regulatory powers on ceded taxes. As of 1 January 2002 all Communities have accepted the model and all have, therefore, such
powers.
BABY BONUSES IN AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES
Autonomous Amount of tax credit for birth or adoption
Community of child
Aragon third and subsequent child: EUR 500
Castilla and Leon first child: EUR 75.13
second child: EUR 150.24
third and subsequent child: EUR 360.61
Catalonia first and subsequent child EUR 300
Galicia first and subsequent child: EUR 240
Rioja second child: EUR 150
third and subsequent child: EUR 180
Madrid first and subsequent child: EUR 280
Valencia third and subsequent child: EUR 150.25
In July 2001 the Communities and the state agreed to
broaden the scope of these ceded taxes. As a result, the
CommunitiesÕ legislative powers over some of these taxes
are now greater and new taxes have been ceded to them.
The new powers over the ceded taxes vary so widely,
depending on the tax, that in some cases the ceded tax
operates as a mere transfer (as in Value Added Tax) and in
others, the broad scope of the powers granted makes the
tax very similar to an autonomous tax (as in gambling
taxes).
CEDED TAXES AS OF 1 JANUARY 2002
Ceded taxes Yield to Administration Legislative 
Communities powers that 
(%) Communities
may take on
individual 33 state – tax rates (must
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VAT 35 state none
excise 40 state none
tax on wine 40 state none
tax on 100 state none
electricity




special tax 100 Communities – tax rates 






V. SOME BASIC CONCLUSIONS
The decentralization process in Spain has occurred rather
quickly and, generally speaking, has been quite success-
ful. Altogether, authority has been devolved to Communi-
ties in an orderly fashion and this new tier of government
has been well accepted by citizens. Nonetheless, some
issues remain unresolved. Thus, while the agreements are
a necessary part of the cooperative federalism model that
exists in Spain, the senate should also play a role in the
process. This will not be possible unless there is a substan-
tial reform of this institution. This reform is now more
necessary than ever, as only an adequate representative
chamber can guarantee that Communities will have a say
in some of the EU policies that affect them. Moreover, as
important as the opinions of the Constitutional Court may
have been in the clarification of the devolution process in
the past, it is imperative for these conflicts to be discussed
and resolved in parliament, thus decreasing what has come
to be known as a ÒjudiciarizationÓ of the ÒState of
AutonomiesÓ.
As to the allocation of resources, an important reassign-
ment of taxation powers has taken place and Communities
now have more room than ever before to design their own
taxation policies. However, they still seem to prefer to rely
mainly on state transfers. Insofar as one of the purposes of
the reforms was to increase the CommunitiesÕ fiscal
responsibility and make them more accountable to tax-
payers for the monies they spend, they may have failed. It
remains to be seen whether the latest increase of Commu-
nity taxation powers will help to change this situation. It is
likely that it will not, since the incentive problems
described remain largely the same in the laws putting the
new agreements into practice.
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